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1 Introduction  
 
Consider Fritz, who is nowadays a happy resident of Saarbrücken. On sun-
ny Saturdays, Fritz has the habit of barbecuing Bratwurst with his friends 
in his yard and going thereafter to his local, the Nächstestrasse Biergarten, 
‘NB’ for short. Fritz may have a couple of beers while eating his Bratwurst 
at home, but nothing which compares to the amount he will drink thereaf-
ter at the beer garden. That is why he always goes by foot: he knows that 
his Blood Alcohol Content, ‘BAC’ hereafter, will not allow him to drive 
his car back home when the time comes to leave. We can break down 
Fritz’s typical Saturday in the following way:  
i)  Fritz starts his day with a very low BAC.  
ii) Fritz stays at home and eats and drinks reasonably during the after-
noon. His BAC rises significantly but not dramatically.  
iii) Fritz goes to NB, where he drinks a less reasonable amount of beer, 
increasing dramatically his BAC.  
iv)  Fritz goes back home, sleeps and lets his BAC level fall back to a 
normal level.  
What have we done here? We have divided up a day according to Fritz’s 
activities and the changes in Fritz and his BAC. We have mentioned sever-
al entities, either by name or by description; for instance, Fritz, the beer 
garden, Fritz’s BAC, Fritz’s home, Fritz’s activities on this Saturday, 
which break down into an afternoon at home, a walk to the NB, a sojourn 
at NB, a walk back. These activities themselves break down into various 
sub-activities of Bratwurst eating, beer drinking, step-taking, and many 
others.  
Not all of these entities are on a par. Surely, all those we have men-
tioned exist in time. It seems also that they are all entities which last for 
more than a mere instant. They are temporally extended. But there is a way 
in which some differ from and a way some resemble each other.  
By the end of the day, Fritz has changed in many ways. He has changed 
because at the start of the day he had neither yet eaten any Bratwurst nor 
drunk any beer nor walked to the NB, etc. In particular, he has changed be-
cause yet another entity, namely his BAC, has changed. In fact the descrip-
tion of Fritz’s typical Saturday was in part an account of the changes in his 
BAC, and hence in himself, over such a day. The Bratwurst, too, has 
changed: each sausage went from raw to cooked to going out of existence 
as a result of being eaten. There have been many qualitative changes (from 
raw to cooked, from ajeun to repus, from sober to intoxicated) and many 
spatial changes also (from the fridge to the barbecue to the bun, from the 
kitchen to the garden, from home to NB, from NB to home).  
Fritz, his BAC and his tiredness are entities which persist in time and 
remain numerically identical through the various changes which they un-
dergo. Fritz is the same entity before, during, and after eating Bratwurst 
and over the whole day, although he has changed during this time. Similar-
ly, his BAC has changed, but it is the same entity which has gone from low 
to mild and from mild to high on the alcoholemic scale. Fritz has gone 
from rested to tired, but it is still always Fritz, through and through, one 
and identical.  
Some of the other entities which we have mentioned are in fact some of 
these very changes. For instance, Fritz’s walk from home to NB is one of 
Fritz’s changes in location. Changes are processes. Taking a step, drinking 
a beer, spending an evening at the beer garden are examples of entities 
which are temporally extended. But in contradistinction to Fritz and his 
BAC, they do not change. It is not that Fritz’s spending an evening at the 
beergarden is first a sitting, then a beer drinking, and so on and so forth. 
The spending of the evening lasts the whole evening, the beer drinking 
lasts a beer, so to speak. The spending of the evening at NB is a complex 
entity made of many other entities which exist only during some part of the 
period during which the whole sojourn exists. Thus there is that part of the 
evening during which Fritz is drinking his sixth beer at the NB.  
Entities of this second kind do not change, because they are themselves 
changes, and they are made up of successive (temporal) parts which are 
also changes.  
Fritz himself, however, is not made up of temporal parts. He exists 
throughout the whole evening (and before and after, of course), and there is 
no entity which would be the transient proxy of Fritz during which he is 
involved in this or that activity, or during which he or his BAC sustains 
this or that change. There is no shorter-lived part of Fritz whose existence 
is restricted to these periods (Inwagen 2000). Fritz’s evening is not a part 
of Fritz, any more than is Fritz’s youth or Fritz’s passage down the birth 
canal. Rather, these are parts of Fritz’s life.  
 
*** 
 
In this paper we aim to provide the ontological grounds for an adequate 
account of persistence. We defend a perspectivalist, or moderate pluralist, 
position, according to which some aspects of reality can be accounted for 
in ontological terms only via partial and mutually complementary ontolo-
gies, each one of which captures some relevant aspect of reality. Our thesis 
here is that this is precisely the sort of ontological account that is needed 
for the understanding of persistence.  
Our brand of moderate pluralism is a generic doctrine, which has been 
applied to the problem of granularity (Smith and Brogaard 2003; Bittner 
and Smith 2003). Here we will present reasons for adopting the doctrine 
also as providing a solution to the problem of persistence. We sketch the 
main categories of possible ontologies for endurance and perdurance with-
out, however, arguing for these in any detail. In particular we do not ad-
dress the topic of substantivalism versus relationalism about space, time or 
spacetime in detail, because we think that our approach is compatible with 
each major variant position on such topics. What we do address in detail is 
the need for two independent ontologies in any account of persistence.  
 
2. Two Sorts of Entities  
 
According to our account of Fritz and of certain portions of his life, there 
are entities that have continuous existence and a capacity to persist self-
identically through time even while undergoing different sorts of changes. 
These entities, sometimes called ‘continuants’, come in several kinds; but 
for the purposes of this paper we will give only a sketch of the most rele-
vant types. On the one hand there are substances and other substantial enti-
ties, which are all bearers of property particulars, and on the other hand 
there are these property particulars themselves – Fritz’s present thirst, for 
example, or his BAC (Smith 1990). Substances are those material entities 
that enjoy a certain rounded-offness or natural completeness (Smith and 
Broogard 2003). In addition to artefacts such as mugs and sausages, organ-
isms are the prototypical examples of substances. The wider category of 
substantial entities embraces not only substances in this sense, but also 
their parts and aggregates, the parts and aggregates of these parts and ag-
gregates, and so forth. Substantial entities are not dependent for their con-
tinued existence upon other entities; they are the bearers of qualities, and 
they are subject to qualitative change. Property particulars are endurants 
requiring a basis in substantial entities in order to exist; they inhere in the 
latter and this inherence is a form of existential dependence (Husserl 
1913/21; Simons 1987). Examples of property particulars include: particu-
larized qualities (the colour of this sausage, the ambient temperature in the 
NG), functions (for example, the function of this barbecue: to cook food), 
roles (as customer, as waiter), dispositions (of vegetables, that they are 
prone to rotting), and so on. Finally, for the sake of expository simplicity, 
we embrace here a so-called absolutist view of space, sometimes called a 
container view. According to this view, spatial regions are entities in their 
own right, which are endurants of such a sort that other endurants can be 
located at or in them. 
In addition, the world contains entities traditionally called ‘occurrents’ 
– entities which occur, which happen to continuants, more familiarly re-
ferred to as processes, events, activities, changes, happenings. Occurrents 
are entities which unfold themselves through a period of time or they are 
the temporal boundaries of such entities. The former are all bound in time 
in the way described by Zemach (1970). This means that each portion of 
the time during which an occurrent occurs can be associated with a corres-
ponding temporal portion of that occurrent. This is because occurrents ex-
ist only in their successive temporal parts or phases. Some of the latter – 
for example, beginnings and endings (the initial and terminal boundaries of 
processes) – are instantaneous. Following Ingarden (1964), we shall re-
serve the term ‘process’ for temporally extended occurrents, and ‘event’ 
for their instantaneous boundaries (which we take to include also the cross-
ings of transition thresholds within processes). Examples are: the begin-
ning of Fritz’s walk; Fritz’s becoming 19 years of age; the detaching of a 
portion of sausage as a result of Fritz taking a bite out of it; the ceasing to 
exist of an electron as a result of collision with a positron. On the occurrent 
side of our ontology we include also the temporal and spatiotemporal re-
gions at which other occurrents are located.  
Prima facie, the view which seems hereby implied, a view which we 
believe is in close conformity with common sense, is that of a bicategorial 
ontology, embracing both continuants and occurrents as entities with equal 
standing. Common sense, however, is not for us an ultimate justification. 
Indeed, although we will defend a view that is close to common sense in 
that it recognizes virtually the same entities, we think nonetheless that a 
bicategorial ontology is untenable.  
In mainstream analytical philosophy, the name of the game when it 
comes to the problem of persistence in time is eliminativism. This forces 
us to choose between either an ontology of continuants, so-called ‘three-
dimensionalism’, or an ontology of occurrents, so-called ‘fourdimensional-
ism’. Following Lewis (1986), the view that continuants are threedimen-
sional is sometimes called ‘endurantism’ (and the way they exist in time is 
to endure), while the view that continuants are fourdimensional is some-
times called ‘perdurantism’ (and the way they exist in time is to perdure). 
From our perspective, however, there are in fact four available alternatives 
from which to choose:  
1) threedimensionalism, according to which the correct ontology for 
handling persistence is a monocategorial ontology of continuants; 
2) fourdimensionalism, according to which the correct ontology for 
handling persistence is a monocategorial ontology of occurrents; 
3)  bicategorialism, according to which the correct ontology for handling 
persistence is a bicategorial ontology of continuants and occurrents; 
4)  two-ontology moderate pluralism, according to which there is no cor-
rect and adequate way of handling persistence within a single ontol-
ogy, but rather two ontologies are needed, which must somehow be 
made to work in tandem. 
While each of the eliminativist strategies is found wanting not only when 
measured against common sense but also when measured against the in-
creasingly important needs of ontology applications, for example in the 
field of biomedicine (Grenon, Smith and Goldberg 2004), bicategorialism 
leads to contradictions. These problems do not, however, arise on the 
fourth option, which is thus the option we favor. 
 
 
3. Rejection of Solutions based on Single Ontologies 
 
3.1 Rejection of Bicategorialism 
 
The reasons for rejecting bicategorialism have to do with the fact that each 
of the two categories of continuant and of occurrent requires an ontology 
with a characteristic which conflicts with a characteristic of the ontology 
required by the other category. There is no single ontology countenancing 
both continuants and occurrents because the proper treatment of these enti-
ties requires different and conflicting treatments of time (Merricks 1995). 
Reasons for this have to do with the fact that under the view of time re-
quired for the proper handling of occurrents, continuants possess incompat-
ible determinations, the countenancing of which leads to contradictions. 
On the other hand, as we shall see shortly, under the view of time required 
by an ontology which recognizes continuants, occurrents simply cannot be 
countenanced.  
Strictly speaking, we should not say that continuants exist in time, be-
cause this expression suggests that continuants are temporal entities which 
belong to an ontology in which time is an entity in its own right. However, 
time itself is not a continuant, and thus it lies beyond the scope of the con-
tinuant ontology. Persisting continuants exist at multiple successive times, 
and they persist from one time to the next. From the point of view of on-
tology, however, they have to be taken, so to speak, one time at a time. We 
could say that they exist over a time in the sense just explained. But be-
cause time does not belong to an ontology of continuants, the contrast be-
tween existing in time and over a time or at multiple times cannot be ex-
pressed using the terms of such an ontology. We can (at the risk of some 
metaphor) look upon time as a dimension of location along which conti-
nuants can move; but that dimension is ipso facto extraneous to the realm 
of continuants. From the standpoint of an ontology of continuants, to ap-
peal to time would be at best to appeal to an abstraction.  
Taking temporality into account on the side of continuants thus requires 
a multiplicity of time-indexed ontologies of continuants corresponding to 
the points along this temporal dimension. There is only one Fritz; but to do 
justice to his persistence through time requires a multiplicity of continuant 
ontologies. Suppose Fritz now1 has a low BAC, and now2 a high one. It is 
not possible to account for the change in Fritz if the Fritz who exists now1 
is seen as an entity existentially on a par with the Fritz who exists now2. 
This is because the two entities would have contradictory properties in vir-
tue of the fact that Fritz has changed (Lowe 2002). It is in order to do jus-
tice to this fact that continuant ontologies like the one we favour see conti-
nuants as existing always at a time. The ontology of continuants is in a 
sense always exemplified in a synchronic fashion – it is exemplified now at 
this moment, now at this moment. There is therefore a need for a multiplic-
ity of ontologies of a sort commonly called ‘presentist’. Each such ontolo-
gy applies to a particular time. These temporally specified continuant on-
tologies recognize no diachronic relations. Diachronic facts about conti-
nuants are rather accounted through relations between entities in ontologies 
with different time indices, and thus temporal considerations concerning 
continuants are relegated to the meta-ontological level (Smith and Grenon 
2004).  
Continuants gain and lose parts over time. It is thus not determinate, 
given two continuants, whether one is part of the other, because the rela-
tions between the two can change from one time to the next. Parthood as a 
relation between continuants must, therefore, always be indexed to time. 
Similarly, continuants change in their properties, and it is not determinate 
across time whether a given continuant has a given property particular in-
hering in it unless this inherence itself is indexed by time.  
This implies, too, that there is no diachronic summation of continuants 
into larger wholes. Suppose, for example that a sausage has a property par-
ticular of being straight at one time and another of being bent at a second 
time. Summing those entities would make for an aggregate, S, which con-
tains the sausage, s, its straight shape, u, and its bent shape, v. But these 
particular straight and bent shape qualities are entities which do not, be-
cause they cannot, co-exist within a single whole – for when would this 
whole exist? The problem of accounting for an entity having incompatible 
properties has been dubbed the problem of temporary intrinsics by Lewis 
(1986). The fourdimensionalist has a solution to this problem: S itself is 
seen as having two temporal parts, one which is made of s and u and one 
which is made of s and v. S itself is therefore an occurrent. The only way to 
countenance continuants within a single ontology in which they are al-
lowed to exist at different times is therefore to transform them into occur-
rents.  
The friend of genuine continuants might be tempted by the idea that 
property particulars are in fact relations to time. It is true that property par-
ticulars inhere in their bearers at a time; but the reconstruction of such facts 
of inherence in terms of relations to time is not satisfactory from an onto-
logical standpoint. Certainly it provides a solution to the problem of logical 
contradiction by creating pairs of distinct consistent statements – u inheres-
now1 in s, v inheres-now2 in s – but since we know of no ontological 
ground to these statements we shall persist in our assumption that this ‘so-
lution’ is a mere syntactic trick.  
In contrast to continuants, occurrents are mereologically determinate 
over time (indeed over worlds): they have the parts they have as a matter of 
necessity (Olson, in press). Occurrents exist in time in a way that allows 
them to be apprehended by a single diachronic ontology (an ontology 
whose purview is extended in time): they exist in time by having parts lo-
cated at different times. Their existence in time is mediated by that of their 
temporal parts, which deputize for them. Occurrents have their properties 
not merely constantly (i.e. at all times at which they occur); they (or their 
respective temporal parts) have their properties essentially. Thus occurrents 
do not change in the way continuants change (Mellor 1981). Here again 
time is a dimension of location. But in contrast to continuants, whose exis-
tence is not specific to a time, occurrents have no degree of freedom with 
respect to time, they are tied essentially to it – this is so whether time itself 
is an entity or some sort of abstraction over the order of occurrents. For 
what is distinctive of the realm of occurrents is that there is a temporal or-
der, built out of temporal relations such as earlier than, whose relata exist 
on a par in spite of the fact that they exist at different times. If time is an 
abstraction, it is an abstraction over the order of occurrents. And whether 
or not it is an abstraction, it still allows the occurrents which are located 
along it to be systematic segmented into arbitrarily large and small tempor-
al parts.  
Only entities which are existentially on a par may be summed or aggre-
gated into a whole. We can take, for instance, the sum of the beer and the 
mug into which it as been poured before Fritz drinks it. But once Fritz has 
drunk and digested his beer and there remains only the mug, then we may 
not sum the mug at that time with the no longer existing beer from the ear-
lier time. Surely, we can still sum up Fritz and what remains, if anything, 
from the beer after it has been digested (some aggregate of scattered mole-
cules that is genidentical to the beer (Lewin 1922)). But it is no longer the 
beer which we sum with Fritz.  
Fourdimensionalism goes hand in hand with a view according to which 
all the entities which exist co-exist; they all exist on a par. For occurrents, 
this view is, unproblematic. We can create the sum of all the beer drinking 
done by Fritz in his life, which is an aggregate of temporally separated ent-
ities. In contrast, the foregoing considerations to the effect that there is no 
single diachronic continuant ontology mean that it is some version of the 
presentist doctrine propounded by Brentano (1976) and Chisholm (1989) 
which is appropriate for dealing with continuants. The presentist holds that 
all entities which exist exist at the present time. Presentism and fourdimen-
sionalism are clearly incompatible. The presentist cannot accept the four-
dimensionalist view according to which time is an entity that is stretched 
out, and that there are many times all of which co-exist in the same way 
that the many marks on a measuring rod co-exist. Times, both instants and 
intervals, are for the fourdimensionalist parts of time and reality as a whole 
is a fourdimensional spatiotemporal block universe (Alexander 1920).  
It is sometimes said that, when tied to presentism, the doctrine of three-
dimensionalism is not even formulable (Hawley 2001) since in order to 
formulate temporal assertions (for example to the effect that continuants 
persist through time), we need to appeal to time itself, which does not be-
long to the presentist ontology. This means that in order to be formulated 
threedimensionalism needs a form of eternalism, which allows the succes-
sive tagging of specific times as ‘the present’ on the basis of some sort of 
indexicalist view. This means adding to our presentist ontology a further 
piece – one that does not fit with the rest of the ontology – in order to ac-
commodate time. This is not in itself an objection against realism about 
continuants, however; it is merely an objection to standard reductionistic 
versions of this doctrine.  
The correlation between two ways of persisting and two incompatible 
ontologies of time is enough to pose the fundamental problem of the ontol-
ogy of persistence. Drawing on an intuition of Zemach (1970), one way of 
rationalizing our view of the inconsistency of the bicategorial view which 
melds the two ontologies together into one would be as follows: distinct 
ways of existing generate distinct ontologies. Continuants and occurrents 
are not simply two categories of entities – or two species of existence – but 
two radically distinct ways of existing in time. And, if both are to be taken 
ontologically seriously, then they require distinct and incompatible ontolo-
gies.  
 
3.2 Rejection of Monocategorial Eliminativism 
 
Contemporary debates on the problem of persistence are standardly formu-
lated in terms of the need for an adjudication between two alternative 
views of temporal existence. These debates grew out of attempts to account 
for the persistence of different types of entities through time, but they have 
turned into a fight over what is the unique way in which all temporal enti-
ties persist. This in turn has contributed to the obliteration of the distinction 
between continuants and occurrents, yielding either eliminativism or one or 
other form of reconstruction (for example, of continuants as more or less 
gerrymandered varieties of occurrents). The background motivation is, of 
course, the widespread tendency on the part of contemporary analytical 
philosophers to believe that they must maximalize ontological parsimony 
at all costs.  
We, in contrast, are not concerned by a motivation of this sort. We are 
interested not just in the theoretical elegance of ontologies but also in their 
practical utility. We thus prefer to conceive debates about reduction and 
reconstruction as belonging to the domain of logical representation rather 
than to ontology properly conceived. When it comes to ontology, and not 
least to the application of ontology in various practical domains, we see the 
need to have both ways of persisting. (The medical ontologist needs both 
Fritz, and Fritz’s BAC, and the risings and fallings of Fritz’s BAC.) More-
over, in addition to these practical considerations, there is also a theoretical 
argument to the effect that each of the two just-mentioned views in fact re-
quires the other.  
Exclusivistic fourdimensionalism holds (in our terms) that only 
processes exist, and that continuants are special kinds of process-things 
(Quine 1960). Time is just another dimension, analogous to the three spa-
tial dimensions, and substantial (threedimensional) entities are analyzed 
away as worms or fibres within the fourdimensional plenum. Strictly 
speaking there is for the fourdimensionalist no such thing as Fritz. Rather, 
there exists within the fourdimensional plenum a continuous succession of 
processes, which are similar in a Fritzing sort of way.  
Exclusivistic threedimensionalist holds (in our terms) that only conti-
nuants exist. This view seeks to eliminate or reduce events and processes 
by conceiving all reference to such entities as a mere façon de parler about 
what is acceptable threedimensionalistically. Talk of occurrents is cashed 
out, logically, as talk of continuants and the properties (‘states’) inhering in 
them at successive points in time. Time itself is an abstraction over state-
ments concerning these.  
For us, both varieties of reduction are unacceptable: for processes to 
stand in the mentioned similarity relation is precisely for them to be a part 
of Fritz’s life. Conversely, there is more to dynamic reality than a mere 
succession of snapshots along a temporal continuum and more to change 
than mere discrepancies along this continuum.  
At the same time, however, we accept that both varieties of reduction 
bring important contributions. Fourdimensionalism brings the signal bene-
fit, from the point of view of rigorous ontology, that its ontology is mereo-
logically determinate. This means that, given any a and any b, it is always 
determinate whether a is part of, or overlaps with, or is disjoint from, or is 
itself a whole including b. Indeed, we hold that fourdimensionalism is right 
in everything it says, but only when it is making assertions about those ent-
ities – precisely the fourdimensional ones – which fall properly within its 
purview. The fourdimensionalist thus does indeed offer, from the stand-
point of realist perspectivalism, one veridical perspective on reality: the 
perspective which apprehends processes and the spatiotemporal regions at 
which they are located. But other, complementary perspectives are required 
also: namely those threedimensional perspectives which capture, for given 
instants of time, the substances (and other continuant entities) which exist 
at and endure through those times. And then not only is it the case that 
each such instantaneous threedimensionalist ontology also enjoys the same 
nice feature that it is mereologically determinate, but also that this same 
feature is preserved when we embrace both the four- and the threedimen-
sional ontologies simultaneously.  
The main problem with threedimensionalism, when rigorously (which 
means, roughly, presentistically) conceived, is that it leaves no room for 
time. The main problem with fourdimensionalism is that it provides no ac-
count of those demarcations in reality which we discover to be so impor-
tant when we need to understand, for example, the facts of biology (asso-
ciative mating, disease transmission, host-pathogen interaction) – it pro-
vides no counterpart of the joints we seem to find in the world around us as 
we encounter organisms and cells and molecules. Occurrents merge with 
each other in unconstrainedly kaleidoscopic ways to make larger and 
smaller perduring wholes. Again: putative unitary occurrents are from the 
fourdimensionalist perspective nothing more than fiat products of the sort 
of gerrymandering alluded to by Quine (1960, §36). Not only can occur-
rents be segmented at will into temporal parts; they can also be summed 
without restriction to form wholes which ride roughshod over the natural 
joints in reality (Varzi 2003).  
Neither of the two views, then, is sufficient by itself. But when merged 
together in a single ontology, they are inconsistent. The solution to this 
quandary consists in the recognition of the fact that the two views are 
complementary. Occurrents are precisely the entities we need in order to 
obtain a temporal line which can be used to index, and provide an ordering 
for, our plurality of time-specific presentistic ontologies of continuants. 
The occurrentist view, on the other hand, is in need of continuants as the 
bearers of its processes, and as that which (through their spatial and tem-
poral boundaries) provide the support for those segmentations of reality at 
its joints which yield up Fritz and his grandfather.  
 
 
 
 
 
4. Ontological Pluralism  
 
What is the picture so far? There is a need for ontologies of two distinct 
types, one for continuants, the other for occurrents. For the former, in fact, 
we need a multiplicity of time-specific ontologies, for the latter one ontol-
ogy suffices, which can be assumed to encompass all of time. That conti-
nuants need to be dealt with at a time, and thus through a plurality of time-
indexed ontologies, does not mean that their existence is confined to one 
time only – as if they would be replaced by a succession of instantaneous 
slices. Ontologies of continuants are like snapshots. They yield views of 
continuants at a time, but these continuants pre- and post-exist such snap-
shots. We thus reject a strong presentist solution, and also reject approach-
es such as Chisholm’s view of continuants as entia successiva and consti-
tuted by a succession of momentary entities (entia per se). It is ontologies 
in the realm of continuants which are tied to time, not the continuant enti-
ties they recognize. The very same continuants reappear in a multiplicity of 
numerically distinct ontologies, as the very same Fritz can appear in a suc-
cession of distinct snapshots. The question then remains as to how, given 
such a framework, we are to go about unifying the two sorts of ontologies.  
The first clue is that changes in continuants are themselves occurrents. 
They are processes which happen to continuants. There is, then, a relation 
between a continuant and an occurrent when the latter is happening in or to 
the former. Each continuant participates in a multiplicity of occurrents and 
each occurrent involves or has as participants one or more continuants.  
For continuants, there is no temporal mereology (no mereology across 
time), but only a temporalized mereology (a mereology at a time). Occur-
rents, on the other hand, can be summed across time. This brings us to the 
major link between continuants and occurrents. We can define the life of a 
continuant as the aggregate of the occurrents in which it participates. This 
definition respects our use of this term in our discussion of Fritz, above. It 
might be thought that this is a dangerous strategy, because the demarcation 
of occurrents is wild and unconstrained and so is their aggregation. It is 
here that we most clearly see at work the interdependency and complemen-
tarity of the two sorts of ontologies. It is continuants that, by persisting 
identically through time and through their participating relations to occur-
rents, provide for the needed individuation of occurrents (a walk to the beer 
garden is a walk of somebody in particular to somewhere in particular). 
Clean joints in the ontology of processes are provided through the well-
boundedness of the temporally extended entities which are their partici-
pants.  
But continuants change; in particular they change mereologically. How, 
then, can the continuant ontologies provide for the needed demarcations in 
the realm of occurrents? Consider, for instance, the changes that occur in 
an organism such as Fritz, who is constantly exchanging matter with the 
outside world. It is precisely in order to do justice to this fact that a frame-
work of numerically distinct ontologies is needed, in each of which we 
once again enjoy the single benefit that the entities recognized are mereo-
logically determinate. Temporal indexation of statements expressing me-
reological relations among continuants is achieved via reference to these 
ontologies.  
Qualitative changes in continuants, too, can yield non-gerrymandered 
demarcations within the realm of occurrents: property particulars come into 
being and they go out of existence. But property particulars may also 
themselves change; thus Fritz’s BAC changes from low to high and his 
nose changes from pink to red. It is then not simply the substance or sub-
stantial entity (Fritz, his nose) which changes, but rather the corresponding 
quality. That is, it is not simply that the nose has successively the quality of 
being pink and then of being red. Rather, the nose has all along its quality 
of being coloured and it is this quality which changes. Fritz’s BAC, in the 
same way, endures through time, but it changes over time in its specific 
determinates. Colour and BAC are determinables (Johnson 1921). Changes 
in such determinables come out as successions of shorter-lived determinate 
qualities. The determinable endures through these changes. Qualities too 
have a life and participate directly in processes and indirectly in the 
processes in which their bearers participate (Smith and Grenon 2004). 
What about instantaneous entities? Do they belong to an ontology of 
continuants or to an ontology of occurrents? The answer is that there are 
instantaneous entities of different categories on both sides of this divide, 
which participate in the corresponding ways of being in time. Instantane-
ous entities which fall within an ontology of continuants might be property 
particulars which, per accidens, endure only instantaneously – for instance, 
the property-particular enjoyed momentarily by Fritz, whose temperature is 
rising continuously, of having a temperature of 93°. Instantaneous entities 
which fall within an ontology of occurrents are, for example, the begin-
nings and endings of occurrents. Mereological relations are, at a certain 
level of generality, category preserving. This means that the parts of an 
entity in the category of substantials are always themselves substantial 
entities and similarly for entities in other categories. Similarly, each of our 
two sorts of ontologies is mereologically cumulative and dissective (Varzi, 
to appear). In other words, belonging to an ontology of a given sort is a 
property which is preserved under mereological relations. The parts of oc-
currents are occurrents; the parts of continuants are continuants. Thus no 
instantaneous temporal part of any occurrent falls within the scope of an 
ontology of continuants and no instantaneous continuant falls within the 
scope of an ontology of occurrents. In particular, space is not an instanta-
neous slice of spacetime.  
Finally, processes are dependent on their bearers. But in which sense 
are they dependent? If processes are dependent on continuants in the way 
that qualities are dependent on their substantial bearers, then this contra-
dicts the claim that eternalism is true for what concerns the realm of occur-
rents. For if this were the case, then occurrents would cease to exist with 
their participants. The solution to this puzzle lies, again, in ontological plu-
ralism. There would be a contradiction if processes and their bearers were 
in the same ontology. Processes co-exist (and thus allow unrestricted me-
reological summation) over the largest span of time there is. To each of the 
points of time within this span there can correspond a temporally indexed 
ontology of continuants. Dependence, too, is temporally indexed and may 
thus hold simpliciter at these times. This allows us to solve a problem that 
arises for the non-pluralist presentist, namely the problem of truth-makers 
for propositions about the past or for propositions involving putative refer-
ence to objects no longer existing, such as the proposition that Fritz is taller 
than Socrates. For even though Socrates no longer exists when Fritz exists 
and thus there may be no direct relations between them, their respective 
lives, on the side of occurrents, do indeed co-exist in the relevant sense 
(Grenon and Smith 2004). The height of Fritz and the height of Socrates 
are in the same boat as their respective bearers: they do not co-exist. But 
their lives – the sums of all processes in which these heights, respectively, 
participate – do co-exist in the relevant sense. We may thus account for the 
alleged facts of comparison between Socrates and Fritz and for a variety of 
other problematic transtemporal relations on the continuant side via links 
between ontologies of the two sorts.  
 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
We started out from an account of persistence in time which fits common 
sense in recognizing both continuants and occurrents. We claimed that a 
simple treatment in terms of a bicategorial ontology does not work because 
it employs contradictory accounts of the nature of being in time. At the 
same time we rejected eliminativism, since both continuantism and occur-
rentism suffer from critical shortcomings, which become especially con-
spicious when we attempt to apply ontologies to real-world problems. We 
suggested instead a form of ontological pluralism: a combination of three-
dimensionalist and fourdimensionalist perspectives, which are mutually 
incompatible views of reality only when embraced together within a single 
ontology. The ontological perspectivalism that is implied here consists in 
the view that any given domain of reality can be viewed from a number of 
different ontological perspectives, all of which can have equal claim to ve-
ridicality. This does not mean that any and every perspective is equally ve-
ridical. For our moderate pluralism is of course constrained by realism – by 
the view that there is a way reality is, independent of the perspectives (lan-
guages, theories, cultures, measuring instruments, ontologies) which we 
human beings adopt.  
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